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1. INTRODUCTION   
Family firms, where the family controls the business through significant 
involvement in ownership and management positions (Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008), 
comprise 85% of all small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the EU and the 
USA (Kontinen & Ojala, 2011a, p. 133), and, in turn, SMEs account for two-thirds of 
all businesses globally (Family Firm Institute, 2014). In this important business 
sector, however, research has been unable to explain satisfactorily why some family 
SMEs prefer to focus on local markets and stability (Kontinen & Ojala, 2011b), while 
others may be more dynamic, striving for international opportunities (Eddleston, 
Kellermanns & Zellweger, 2012).  
Certainly, family SME research has identified the strategic decision to hire 
professional managers from outside the family as being crucial, recognizing the 
importance of their talent and skills (e.g. knowledge of customer attitudes, business 
practices, distribution channels, languages, marketing strategies and exporting 
documentation and procedures) for entry into foreign markets (Benavides-Velasco, 
Quintana-Garcia, & Guzman-Parra, 2013; Graves & Thomas, 2006; Stewart & Hitt, 
2012). However, this key strategic choice, i.e. whether to seek managerial 
professionalization via external managers recruited from outside the family, cannot be 
seen as a stand-alone decision but needs to be considered within the whole family 
SME governance mechanism (Huse, 2000).  
It is well recognized in the literature that family firms are heterogeneous in 
their governance structures (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Siebels & Knyphausen- 
Aufseß, 2012). For example, levels of ownership and management may vary 
(Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012) to produce different types of firm 
(Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013; Nordqvist, Sharma, & Chirico, 2014) that, in 
turn, may act differently with respect to their internationalization (i.e. Graves & 
Thomas, 2006). In this paper we argue that only a consideration of the separate and 
combined effects of family ownership and management (both from within the family 
and externally hired professionals) can better explain the internationalization 
outcomes of family SMEs. 
However, these effects are not straightforward since research on family SME 
internationalization has turned out to be rather complex, both theoretically and 
empirically. Family firms represent contested terrain for governance paradigms such 
as agency, stewardship and Socio-Emotional Wealth (SEW) theories that have 
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generated contrasting theoretical predictions for family ownership and control (i.e. 
Gomez-Mejia, Campbell, Martin, Hoskisson, Makri & Sirmon, 2014; Miller, Le-
Breton-Miller, Lester & Canella Jr., 2007). Empirical studies have in turn reflected 
these theoretical contradictions. Whereas some studies have concluded that family 
ownership and control have a positive impact on the internationalization of a business 
(e.g. Zahra, 2003), others have argued that these family-related factors have a 
negative effect on a firm’s international activities (e.g. Fernández & Nieto, 2006; 
Graves & Thomas, 2006; Majocchi & Strange, 2012; Muñoz-Bullon & Sanchez-
Bueno, 2012). Some studies have even detected no significant influence (e.g. Merino, 
Monreal-Pérez, & Sánchez-Marín, 2014). These apparent contradictions may have 
been to some extent the consequence of the empirical decision in the majority of 
studies (e.g. Cerrato & Piva 2012; Fernandez & Nieto, 2005) to use a dichotomous 
(family versus non-family) categorization of family SMEs.  
Building on George, Wiklund, & Zahra (2005, p. 210) who concluded that 
governance structures “…influence the proclivity to take risks and expand the scale 
and scope of [SME] internationalization efforts”, this paper argues that we need to 
reconsider and overcome this family/non-family dichotomy (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2014) in order to increase our understanding of the separate and combined impact of 
ownership and management on family SME internationalization. As a further 
empirical refinement we propose an improved entropy measure of family SME 
internationalization based on its scope rather than its volume.   
Our paper proposes these empirical improvements and offers a possible 
resolution of the contested theoretical terrain that has been identified by focusing on 
the interaction between governance (ownership) and management (strategy to hire 
outside managers) and their joint influence on the strategic outcome of 
internationalization. We propose a new and integrative theoretical framework based 
on a synthesis of theories of corporate governance in relation to family ownership, 
and theories of social capital for external managerial hires. We argue that this 
synthesis is necessary for the generation of nuanced hypotheses concerning the full 
impact of family ownership and control. 
To test these hypotheses we base our empirical analysis on a sample of 417 
Italian manufacturing family SMEs, and address governance and strategy (and their 
interaction) in a context where ownership patterns are relatively simple, and 
information about strategies (e.g. hires of outside managers) is relatively easy to 
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access and assess, compared to large firms (Siebels & Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012) 
demonstrating the importance of this interaction to explain governance-strategy-
performance in family SMEs. In other words, we are able to analyze this theoretical 
sequence with family firms in a way not possible with larger firms. 
Our paper contributes to the general SME internationalization literature and to 
the nascent literature on the internationalization of family SMEs (Calabrò, Torchia, 
Pukall, & Mussolino, 2013; Kontinen & Ojala, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Liang, Wang & 
Cui, 2014; Merino et al., 2014; Pukall & Calabrò, 2014; Segaro, Larimo, & Jones, 
2014; Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan & Pieper, 2012) by analyzing the diversity of 
governance mechanisms in family SMEs as a potential explanation for some of the 
mixed and often contradictory results (Chrisman et al., 2012). We present theoretical 
explanations of our findings, and explain how prior, inconsistent studies may be 
reconciled in a field where “…empirical verification is needed” (Sharma, 2004, p. 
15). 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The analysis of the effect of outside managers and ownership on the 
internationalization of SMEs in general, and family firms in particular, involves social 
capital theory and competing variants of theories of corporate governance. Prior 
research has used social capital to explain how SMEs access resources to succeed 
internationally (e.g. Agndal, Chetty & Wilson, 2008), and corporate governance 
theories to investigate the effects of ownership on internationalization (e.g. George et 
al., 2005). The first theoretical lens helps us to frame the inclusive role played by 
external managers in bridging SMEs to external resources, and the second allows us 
to analyze the relationships between owners and managers and the impact of these 
relationships on internationalization. 
 
2.1 Social Capital 
“Social capital is the contextual complement to human capital” (Burt, 2000, p. 
347). While human capital refers to the quality of an individual, social capital refers 
to the relationships created between people (Burt, 1999).  These represent the “actual 
or potential resources” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248) that a firm can “…access and/or 
mobilize in purposive actions” (Lin, 2001, p. 12). Adler & Kwon (2002) define social 
capital, therefore, as the relationships between individuals and organizations that 
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facilitate action and create value, or "...the goodwill and resources made available to 
an actor via reciprocal, trusting relationships..." (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon & Very, 2007, 
p. 73). We find these relationships within an organization (internal social capital) 
and/or between an organization and its external parties (external social capital) 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). With the limited resources of SMEs in general, research 
has shown social capital to be a significant influence on their internationalization 
(Chetty & Pahlberg, 2015; Kontinen & Ojala, 2011b; Musteen, Francis & Datta, 
2010; Prashantham & McNaughton, 2006; Zhou, Wu & Luo, 2007), and many 
scholars (e.g. Agndal et al., 2008; Presutti, Boari & Frattocchi, 2007; Yli-Renko, 
Autio & Tontti, 2002) have argued that SMEs rely heavily on external relationships to 
acquire information and gain access to foreign markets.  
No firm may control all of the resources that it needs to compete in the 
marketplace and networks (as a resource) are not independent of other resources. In 
relation to financial capital, for example, Toms & Filatotchev (2004) emphasize the 
network contacts that may become available when firms admit outside investors, 
particularly when outsiders are given seats on the board (Majocchi & Strange, 2012); 
similarly, the recruitment of outside managers may facilitate access to their network 
contacts, introducing improved knowledge of the industry, cognitive diversity and 
environmental scanning (Hatum & Pettigrew, 2004). This paper argues (see below 
under Hypotheses) that social capital theory explains the importance of externally-
recruited managers to family firms, mainly through their combination of bonding and 
bridging social capital. However, managerial selection and ownership characteristics 
are not just independent processes but represent two faces of the same coin, especially 
in the context of family SMEs, where ownership is key to the control of managers and 
could facilitate or hinder the social capital of outsiders (Burt, 2000, p. 399). Put 
differently, the social capital brought by outsiders (i.e. external managers) could be 
contingent on the firm’s ownership structure and/or subject to the positive or negative 
perceptions of the owning family (De Massis, Kotlar & Frattini, 2013). We therefore 
synthesize social capital with corporate governance theory that stresses the 
importance of the interaction between the presence of outside managers and 
ownership distribution. We develop this second, complementary approach to family 
firm internationalization in the next section.  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance  
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SMEs and family firms are mainly distinguished by their unique corporate 
governance, or the means by which managers are controlled (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997), and theories of corporate governance are contested terrain inhabited by agency, 
SEW and stewardship theories.  
An agency perspective has dominated most family firm research, with its 
focus on contractual arrangements and its assumption of opportunistic parties 
constrained by governance institutions (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, firms owned 
by outside shareholders must resolve Jensen & Meckling’s (1976) “divorce” of 
ownership and control. Outside shareholder principals and salaried, non-family 
managerial agents introduce the familiar problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. We refer to these costs as “Type I” agency costs or principal/agent 
problems.  
One important means of coping with Type I agency problems involves 
blockholders or strategic investors (Singla, Veliyath & George, 2014). Blockholders 
are typically defined as shareholders owning a large fraction of the firm’s equity, 
(Denis, Denis & Sarin, 1999) who therefore have an incentive and power to monitor 
managers in a vertical hierarchy. Indeed, families with their concentrated ownership 
and tight control constitute the ultimate blockholders, attenuating Type I costs since 
family owners are incentivized to monitor themselves (and others) as managers, i.e. 
with self and horizontal monitoring rather than through vertical supervision 
(Bainbridge, 2012).  
However, outside ownership in family firms (i.e. family ownership with 
control less than 100%) may theoretically re-introduce the separation of managers and 
owners and also “Type II” (or principal/principal) agency problems: where minority 
investors have weaker incentives to monitor managers and outsiders also run the risk 
of being exploited by other investors with bigger stakes and who may enjoy private 
benefits from their control (Faccio, Lang & Young, 2001). Of course, we can view 
these private benefits as attractive sources of SEW (as discussed below) by families, 
but also as Type II agency costs by outside investors. Family shareholders with 
salaried managerial positions may reduce Type I agency costs but we may also 
perceive them as being under-diversified, with all their “eggs in one basket” in 
relation to their human capital and financial investments. Such trade-offs between 
negative costs and positive benefits are typical of theories of family governance, 
where net outcomes may depend empirically upon local circumstances.   
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At the same time, the corporate governance literature has developed softer, 
less cynical and more “socialized” theories of family governance. Like agency theory, 
however, they can yield negative as well as positive predictions. SEW theory 
(Berrone, Cruz & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone & De Castro, 
2011) emphasizes reputational and affectional (i.e. non-financial) values (Arregle, 
Naldi, Nordqvist & Hitt, 2012), where family members derive utility from family 
influence and identification with the firm, with future generations of the family taken 
into account, i.e. “…creating a legacy” (George et al., 2005, p. 214). In other words, 
families enjoy the benefits that agency theorists see as costs from the shareholders’ 
point of view.  
SEW theorists (e.g. Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011) take a balanced view of these 
benefits and costs. For example, compared with non-family employees and 
shareholders, family members have their financial and human resources locked in and 
cannot easily exit the family firm. This means that their internal voice may replace 
their exit threat, and this parallels the self- and horizontal monitoring of agency 
theory, with the monitoring of managers carried out by themselves or by peers rather 
than by superiors, e.g. shareholders. We may perceive human resource management 
practices to be more generous and positive in family firms from an SEW perspective, 
but management succession decisions may still disregard professionals from outside, 
with negative consequences (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).  
Stewardship theory (Miller et al., 2007) views family members as being 
closely attached to their firm and acting as responsible stewards for the whole 
business. This approach extends the SEW perspective beyond the family to embrace 
other stakeholders besides family members. Thus, governance based on stewardship 
may lead to higher and longer-term investments in relations with customers, lenders 
and employees, and access to “patient” long-term capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).  
 In contrast with SEW and stewardship theories, an agency perspective 
considers that the family preferences identified by these theories are costly, not 
beneficial, leading to nepotism and the entrenchment of families (Burkart, Panunzi & 
Shleifer, 2003). Where family assets have a financial and non-financial value, 
Verbeke & Kano (2012) identify a “bifurcation bias” in family firms towards SEW 
promoting investments, which are in their view dysfunctional.  
What do these mixed perspectives mean for the specific outcome of 
internationalization in the context of family SMEs? In Table 1 we use the distinction 
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between family-influenced and family-controlled SMEs (Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt & 
Webb, 2008; Arregle et al., 2012) to summarize the theoretical effects on 
internationalization of different degrees of family ownership (i.e. low or high family 
ownership), and management (i.e. family managers only, or of family members and 
externally recruited managers). We argue that the efficiency effects of external 
managerial recruitment will depend on whether a family firm is unilaterally controlled 
(i.e. the family has majority ownership >50%) or just family influenced (i.e. the 
family is the main shareholder but where the family does not have unilateral control 
<50%).  
 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
Although we couch Table 1 in general terms, with the signs on its elements 
viewed from an agency, economic efficiency perspective, it is easy to interpret in the 
context of internationalization. Table 1 shows that we may associate high (>50%) 
levels of family ownership combined with some family representation in decision-
making with many negative effects (quadrants 2 and 4). In terms of 
internationalization, Type II agency problems may be high, and international projects 
resisted; under-diversified, relatively loss-averse family members may oppose 
internationalization, arguably involving additional costs/risks. In this type of firm, 
controlling family owners may exploit outside shareholders by pursuing strategies for 
their own benefit, rather than for all shareholders (i.e. Type II agency problems). This 
means that they may overlook profitable opportunities in international markets if they 
do not offer improved SEW for the family. In addition, SEW theory would predict 
family resistance to external ownership and capital that dilute their own stakes, and a 
preference for conservative decisions that favor local stakeholders (employees and 
customers) rather than international ones.  
The only positive arguments in favor of internationalization by SMEs with 
unilateral family control (quadrants 2 and 4) would emphasize the attenuation of Type 
I agency costs with family owner-managers and their access to patient capital with a 
long-term perspective, possibly leading to long-term investments in international 
markets. However, agency theorists would see even such long-termism as counter-
efficient, and family members with unilateral control are likely to impact negatively 
on strategies like internationalization that may lead to higher levels of risk (Gentry, 
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Dibrell & Kim, 2014) because they may depend on the firm for their employment, 
their long-term personal and family wealth, (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) as well as their 
SEW, and this may discourage them from seeking internationalization involving 
further resource commitments. In the context of this paper, “…the preservation of 
SEW is purported to affect diversification strategies” (Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014, 
p. 1312). Overall, our analysis suggests that when firms are family-controlled, the 
positive effects of hiring external managers are absent, and Type I and II agency costs 
remain high (quadrant 4).  
In contrast, in quadrant 3, we may expect family-influenced SMEs (with 
<50% family ownership and with family and external managers), to generate a 
predominance of positive attitudes towards internationalization from external 
shareholders and managers. A growing stream of literature (Anderson & Reeb, 2004) 
argues that this type of firm may combine the benefits of minority family ownership 
with only a few of the negative side-effects of unilateral control. In other words, 
allowing “other voices at the table” (Sirmon et al., 2008) may generate a positive 
internal dialogue between different stakeholders. At the same time the firm may 
preserve close links between family shareholders and managers to a large degree. 
In this kind of firm, while all the positive aspects of family firms remain in 
place, a more plural composition of shareholders may mitigate their main weaknesses. 
The presence of majority outside shareholders reduces the total identification of the 
firm with the family, limiting Type II agency problems, e.g. the extraction of private 
benefits such as personal loans to family insiders, appropriation of corporate 
opportunities or excessive compensations (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). All of these 
behaviours may divert resources away from the more profitable business 
opportunities that may arise in foreign markets. While family dominance is less 
pronounced, family values may remain at the core of business strategies, but a more 
balanced approach to internationalization could emerge from a mix of different 
perspectives on boards. 
It can be seen from this theoretical background, therefore, that theories of 
social capital and corporate governance both generate strong presumptions in favour 
of the hiring of external professional managers by SMEs, and particularly family-
influenced firms, in the context of internationalization. The conditions under which 
this assumption holds true are discussed in the next section, where we use our theories 
together to generate hypotheses, supported by relevant, extant empirical findings.    
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3. HYPOTHESES 
Although “…SMEs typically rely more extensively on network relationships 
as they pursue international opportunities” (Musteen et al., 2010, p. 197), the trouble 
with family firms (85% of SMEs) is that “…networks both facilitate and constrict 
internationalization by SMEs” (Musteen et al., 2010, p. 203). Family SMEs typically 
possess strong internal, or “bonding”, social capital, i.e. socially homogeneous 
relationships with other members of the firm but lack external, heterogeneous 
“bridging” relationships (Prashantham & McNaughton, 2006; Schuller, Baron & 
Field, 2000). In this context, family ties within family firms represent an extreme 
form of bonding social capital – or “family capital” (Kontinen & Ojala, 2011a, p. 134; 
Hoffman, Hoelscher & Sorenson, 2006) – that brings family members together, 
probably having the same set of shared norms and values. In this case the two forms 
of social capital – the family’s and the firm’s – coexist (Arregle et al., 2007; 
Lansberg, 1983).  
However, activities in foreign markets may require specific external social 
capital in the form of managerial knowledge and capabilities. Marketing strategies 
must be adapted to new market conditions and the management of a firm’s finances 
and risks typically become more complex. In short, internationalization, even if only 
in the relatively simple form of exports, requires specialized and professional 
management (Sciascia et al., 2012). This is even truer when firms sell in many 
different countries. In this case the diversity of national contexts in terms of 
consumers’ behaviors, legal and administrative requirements, and market conditions 
increase significantly the complexity that managers should handle. This in turn sets 
the bar higher for SMEs that need specific additional expertise, experience and 
networks to address the increased complexity.  
In family SMEs, however, managers are typically family members (Wilson, 
Wright & Scholes, 2013), and a steady stream of literature (e.g. Classen, Carree, Van 
Gils & Peters, 2014; Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez & Wolfenzon, 2007) has 
reported that family management may be detrimental to firm performance, and to 
internationalization. This literature proposes that restricting managerial selection to 
the family severely limits the potential quality of the management team. Moreover, 
Bloom & Van Reenen (2007) highlighted the existence of what they called the 
“Carnegie effect”, i.e. the limited investments in education and training by family 
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members who can rely on a guarantee that they hold lifetime management positions. 
If family firms recruit internally, this is likely to add others to the management team 
who are similar in terms of networks and contacts (Arregle et al., 2007; Prashantham 
& McNaughton, 2006). This all suggests that family SMEs are likely to have to 
recruit outside professionals in order to increase the scale and scope of 
internationalization. 
In terms of social capital, outside managers and “…bridging ties may foster 
novel ideas, knowledge and opportunities that are valuable to internationalizing 
SMEs; yet, they tend to be geographically distant and difficult to access” 
(Prashantham & McNaughton, 2006, p. 448). They go on to consider bridging ties 
with local multinational enterprises but in the context of this paper, the hiring of 
outside professionals may constitute an alternative opportunity for the acquisition of 
bridging social capital, and particularly access to knowledge of internationalization, 
which could be internalized and bonded within the firm.  
Therefore, the hiring of external managers plays a double function, avoiding, 
on one side, the managerial entrenchment that is typical of family firms (Gallo & 
Vilaseca, 1998) and providing, on the other hand, a new, diverse source of managerial 
knowledge in the form of additional experience and expertise plus additional contacts 
and relationships. This overlap of networks between the family and the external 
managers may enrich the firm’s overall social capital (Jack, 2005; Arregle et al. 
2007), and may in turn enhance its ability to develop a stronger and more diversified 
internationalization. The theoretical arguments presented above establish a strong 
presumption in favor of hypotheses predicting positive relationships between external 
managers and internationalization. So in line with the prediction of social capital 
theory that external managers may be an efficient local source of bridging social 
capital, and have broad knowledge of international business, we hypothesize that:  
 
H1 - In family SMEs, there is a positive relationship between the presence of external 
managers and internationalization. 
 
H1 is not new, however, and, as reported in the introduction, empirical testing 
to date has variously concluded that family managers have a positive impact on the 
internationalization of a business (e.g. Zahra, 2003), while others have found that 
these family-related factors have a negative impact (Fernández & Nieto, 2006; Graves 
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& Thomas, 2006; Majocchi & Strange, 2012; Muñoz-Bullon & Sanchez-Bueno, 
2012). Some studies even detect no influence at all (Merino et al., 2014). Sciascia et 
al. (2012) estimate for international entrepreneurship an optimal mix of family 
involvement in the management team, involving a high proportion of outsiders, while 
Majocchi & Strange (2012) find that external board members are associated with 
increased levels of internationalization. Some of these contradictory results may be 
the consequence of the dichotomous (family versus non-family) ownership 
categorization of family SMEs that is prevalent in the majority of studies (e.g. Cerrato 
& Piva 2012; Fernandez & Nieto, 2005) and confirmed by recent meta-analyses 
(Machek, Hnilica & Brabec, 2014; O’Boyle, Pollack & Rutherford, 2012). 
This paper argues that the family/non-family firm dichotomy needs to be 
reconsidered in the context of interaction with external managers: there is an infinite 
number of combinations of family ownership and family control, and the main thrust 
of this paper is that the impact of non-family managers depends on the concentration 
of family ownership (Calabrò et al., 2013; Yang, 2010), where corporate governance 
theories explain how outside ownership and outside management may interact. An 
inspection of quadrant 3 in Table 1 shows that majority outside ownership may 
amplify any positive effects of the presence of external managers. Majority outside 
ownership could conceivably introduce certain Type I agency problems, but if 
external shareholders support externally recruited managers in their decisions, Type II 
agency costs will be lower compared to quadrant 4. External shareholders may reduce 
bifurcation bias (Verbeke & Kano, 2012) and they are also likely to be more 
diversified than family owners, implying less loss aversion and opposition to 
internationalization; outside owners may be less emotionally attached to local 
stakeholders and, finally, there may be less hostility towards obtaining the external 
finance necessary for internationalization. In family-influenced SMEs (with minority 
family ownership <50%), the presence of outside investors shifts the nature of “mixed 
gambles” in favour of more investment in costly/risky projects (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2014) where external professional managers can fully exploit their networks, 
knowledge, talent and skills to successfully manage entry into foreign markets. In 
other words, family-influenced SMEs allow social capital resources to play their 
crucial competitive role (Pearson, Carr & Shaw, 2008) and these firms are more likely 
to exhibit lower loss aversion and to recognize the potential for further gains from 
internationalization.  
 12 
To summarize, it is quadrant 3 in Table 1 that represents the dominant positive 
consequences of the presence of external managers in family-influenced SMEs 
compared with family-controlled ones. We therefore propose a second hypothesis:   
 
H2 – The effect of the involvement of external managers on internationalization 
depends on the level of family ownership and it will be more positive for family-
influenced (low level of family ownership) than for family-controlled SMEs. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data 
Our empirical work is based on the ninth and tenth waves of the Italian 
“Survey of Manufacturing Firms” collected by Capitalia (now UniCredit, the largest 
Italian bank by assets) in 2004 and 2007. This bank collected the data from a large 
sample of manufacturing firms over a period of six years (2001-2003 for the ninth 
wave and 2004-2006 for the tenth wave), and the bank triangulated its survey 
responses with data held in the AIDA database (part of the Bureau Van Dijk) and the 
CEBI database (originally set up by the Association of Italian Chambers of 
Commerce). This triangulating procedure increased sample reliability and overcame 
the methodological limitations of using self-reported surveys as the only source. The 
initial balanced panel dataset provided by the bank for the two survey waves 
comprised 1,049 Italian manufacturing firms (UniCredit, 2008).  
Of course, even the most ardent advocates of archival data must concede that 
current researchers can have no control of data collected in the past (Hughes & 
Goodwin, 2014), but we would argue that these surveys represent a vital archival 
resource, professionally collected from very large samples of firms. The use of the 
same archival secondary dataset by other scholars in previous published works (e.g. 
Cerrato & Piva, 2012; Hall, Lotti & Mairesse, 2009) is also a further sign of the 
reliability of our data source and it allows comparability of our results. 
We focused our analysis on unlisted firms with 11-250 employees, thus 
complying with the European Commission (2003) definition of SMEs. This lead us to 
a balanced panel consisting of 736 Italian manufacturing SMEs. We concentrated on 
manufacturing SMEs for three reasons. First, the Italian industrial system is largely 
dominated by manufacturing SMEs (European Commission, 2009). Second, we 
considered exports, which are the typical internationalization mode for manufacturing 
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but not services SMEs. With the intangibility and inseparability of services, 
production and distribution activities may overlap so that sales to foreign clients may 
require that either the firm or the clients must relocate (Blomstermo, Sharma & Sallis, 
2006), so service exports are often not a significant indicator of internationalization 
(Czinkota, Grossman, Javalgi & Nugent, 2009). Third, Italy is a very interesting 
setting for analysing manufacturing exports, as the second largest manufacturing 
country in Europe after Germany and the eighth largest manufacturing exporter in the 
world (World Bank, 2015). 
In order to select our sample of family SMEs we referred to previous studies 
(Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 1999; Zahra, 2003) where family involvement in both 
ownership and management distinguishes family firms. Research has measured 
family ownership as the percentage of equity held by family members, and family 
involvement in management as the number of a firm’s managers who are family 
members (e.g. Chua et al., 1999; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008). From our sample of 736 
Italian manufacturing SMEs we had to remove 90 observations as firms did not report 
information on the type of management (family or externals). In our reduced panel of 
646 Italian manufacturing SMEs, families owned 458 firms (70.9%), i.e. the largest 
shareholder was a family member. However, we considered only 418 (64.79%) to be 
family SMEs, where family members were also managers. We only considered 417 of 
these family SMEs for analysis in relation to our dependent variable, as explained 
below.  
The average percentage of family ownership in our sample of 417 family 
SMEs was 51.4% (SD 24.1%). This is in line with prior studies on family SME 
internationalization that define family SMEs in terms of a majority (>50%) of shares 
in family hands (i.e. Graves & Thomas, 2006), with one or more family members in 
managerial positions (i.e. Fernandez & Nieto, 2006). 
Besides the percentage of family ownership, we also distinguished family 
SMEs into family-controlled and family-influenced SMEs, following Sirmon et al. 
(2008) and Arregle et al. (2012): family-controlled firms had family ownership >50% 
and at least one member of the family was involved in the management team; in a 
family-influenced firm, family ownership was <50% and at least one family member 
of the management team. Accordingly, the number of family-influenced SMEs in our 
sample was 254 (out of 417, i.e. 60.9%) and family-controlled SMEs were 163 
(39.1%). The average family ownership shares in a family-controlled and family-
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influenced SME were 76.3%, and 36.4% respectively. 
 
4.2 Variables and Measures  
4.2.1 Dependent variable 
Previous studies have mainly employed the most common measure of the 
scale of SME internationalization, i.e. the ratio of foreign to total sales (FSTS), 
equivalent to export intensity if the latter includes the local sales of overseas 
representative offices, subsidiaries, etc. as a dependent variable (Katsikeas, Leonidou 
& Morgan, 2000; Lu & Beamish, 2001; Westhead, Wright & Ucbasaran, 2001). 
However, while this provides one simple measure of the scale of internationalization, 
it does not provide a fine-grained measure of its scope. Indeed Rugman & Verbeke, 
(2004) proposed the geographical distribution of sales as a complementary measure of 
internationalization. For example, two firms may show similar export intensities, but 
one could export to a single neighbouring country, while a second had sales to many 
countries over three continents. With similar export intensities, the levels of 
complexity to be managed could be quite different, so a count measure of export 
destinations has complemented export intensity (George et al., 2005). However, this 
measure does not account for the different weight of sales in different countries. The 
entropy measure addresses specifically this limitation by considering jointly the 
number of countries and the distribution of exports. This measure derives from the 
entropy index which measures firms’ product diversification (Jacquemin & Berry, 
1979) and lately a firm’s international diversification (Gomez-Mejia, Makri & 
Kintana, 2010; Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller & Connelly, 2006; Majocchi & Strange, 2012; 
Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014). Therefore, we used this entropy index to measure 
international diversification (or scope) as our preferred dependent variable.  
In order to develop this entropy variable we considered the geographical 
distribution of sales to ten different areas: domestic, the Euro Zone, other countries 
within the EU, other non-EU European countries, China, other Asian countries, 
Africa, North America, Latin America and Oceania. Using this classification, we 
calculated our measure of international diversification as: 
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Here, the subscript j defined one of the ten different destination areas, and xj is 
the ratio FSTS for that specific market j. The natural logarithm of the inverse of the 
sales realized in every market was the weight given to each geographical segment. 
This measure is zero for a firm with concentrated sales in just one country, and the 
maximum value of the measure would be 2.302 in the theoretical case of a firm with a 
perfectly homogeneous ratio of sales of 10% in all ten regions.  
Since our sample comprises SMEs, almost all firms have domestic sales, with 
many having sales concentrated predominately in the domestic market. This 
distribution is consistent with recent findings that show that, even in a context of 
growing globalization, firms tend to have sales concentrated in the home and regional 
markets (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004), particularly family firms (Banalieva & 
Eddleston, 2011). Our measure of international scope takes a value of zero when a 
firm concentrates all its sales in one country, whether home or abroad. In this case our 
dependent variable would be biased (Brouthers, Nakos, Hadjimarco & Brouthers, 
2009). We controlled for this contingency and found only one of our 418 family 
SMEs with a FSTS ratio of 100%, with only one export market, and therefore an 
entropy measure of zero. We dropped this case, so the final sample for our analysis 
was 417 firms. 
As a further robustness check (see section 5.1 below) we controlled for the 
correlation between our entropy measure and the more traditional FSTS ratio. This 
correlation was quite high at .7316 (p<0.01) suggesting that our entropy measure 
proxies a similar phenomenon to the FSTS ratio, but with the additional strength of 
weighting the index for the number of export destinations. The case of two firms with 
an FSTS of 50% but with a different distribution of export clarifies the point, e.g. the 
first firm has all its foreign sales concentrated in one country while the second has 
10% of its sales each in five different regions. While FSTS does not measure the 
increased complexity faced by the second firm, our entropy measure does, since the 
entropy index would be 0.693 for the first firm and 1.498 for the second. 
In our case, the average value of the dependent variable was 0.533, ranging 
from zero to a maximum of 2.23, with the average value dominated by the high 
number of SMEs focused on domestic sales. With our sample of 417 family SMEs, 
115 (27.5% of the total sample) had an entropy value of zero. This distribution of the 
dependent variable suggested not using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in our 
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estimation procedure. We address this issue below. 
 
4.2.2. Independent variables  
Our main independent variable measured the presence of external managers in 
family SMEs. We considered a dummy variable (External managers) taking the value 
of 1 when the family SMEs employed external managers besides family managers, 
and zero when the family SMEs employed only family managers, since Enriques & 
Volpin (2007) consider this an appropriate measure of the presence of specialist, 
independent executives in family firms, the number of family SMEs with external 
managers was 127 (i.e. 30% of 417): 77 family-influenced and 50 family-controlled. 
This variable External managers appears as the main independent variable for our 
Models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 5, and as the independent and moderator variable for our 
Models 5 and 6 where we interacted it with the level of family ownership. 
Our second set of independent variables measure family ownership. We used 
two measures. First, we used a dummy variable (Family influenced) equal to 1 when 
family ownership is <50% and the management team has at least one family member, 
i.e. when family ownership is greater than 50% (i.e. the firm is family-controlled, and 
there is at least one member of the family involved in the management team) the 
dummy takes the value of 0. Second, we also used the percentage of family ownership 
in its continuous form, taking values between 0 and 100 (Family ownership), and used 
in Models 5 and 6 respectively.  
 
4.2.3 Control variables 
We included the standard control variables adopted in previous research on 
SME internationalization’s determinants (e.g. Lu & Beamish, 2001; Westhead et al., 
2001). Using Pavitt’s (1984) well-known taxonomy that classifies sectors according 
to their technological traits, we included four different industrial sectors: the 
“Traditional” sector (53.72% of firms in our sample), “Scale-intensive” industries 
(14.87%), “Specialized-suppliers” (28.30%) and “Science-based” industries (3.12%). 
Since the traditional sector was the most relevant category in our sample (see Table 
2), we used it as the reference sector for three sector dummies.  
We also identified four Italian regions with specific dummies: the North-West 
(37.41% of firms in our sample), North-East (29.99%), Centre (19.18%) and the 
South combined with Sardinia and Sicily (South & Islands) (13.43%). The North 
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West, our biggest region, became our reference region. Given the significant regional 
differences in the distribution of firm-specific location-bound advantages (Basile, 
2001) we expected that this control variable would significantly influence foreign 
sales by family SMEs. As the firm’s membership of a business group can affect the 
international activities of a family SME (Cerrato & Piva, 2012; Chung, 2014), we also 
controlled for this with a dummy variable (Group): unity if the firm belonged to a 
group (11.99% of our sample), zero otherwise. 
Finally, we considered additional controls in relation to internationalization: 
size, age, past profitability, innovation levels and past internationalization. Following 
Verwaal & Donkers (2002) we represented firm size by the log of total employees 
(Size), while our sample ranged from 11 to 250 employees (mean 70.28 with a SD of 
48.23). We measured a firm’s experience (Age) by the years since foundation 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), with an average of 31.6 years for our sample. In order to 
measure past profitability we used Return On Investment (ROI) in the year 2003 
(average value 15.98%). To measure innovation, we used Research and Development 
(R&D) employees over the total number of employees (R&D) rather than an input 
measure of the innovation process (such as R&D expenditure over total sales) as prior 
studies have reported this as unreliable, particularly in an SME context (Hoffman, 
Parejo, Bessant & Perren, 1998). We also controlled for path dependency (Hashai, 
2011) by using the percentage of foreign sales in regional markets in 2003 
(Reg_sales). We believe that this approach also corresponds with prior literature, e.g. 
Banalieva & Eddleston (2011) reported a “regional” path dependency among firms 
characterized by a high level of family management, as in our case. We present a list 
of all our variables and a description of their measurement in Table 2. 
 
TABLES 2 NEAR HERE 
 
We report the descriptive statistics for both our binary and continuous 
variables in Tables 3 and 4, together with correlation indices. The low value of all the 
indices suggests that multicollinearity need not be a cause of concern. As a further 
test, we also calculated Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all the variables. The 
average VIF value was 1.45 with a maximum of 3.06 for our interaction terms. All the 
VIF values are well below the usual thresholds reported in the literature (Studenmund, 
1992), confirming that multicollinearity is not an issue for our analysis.   
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TABLES 3 and 4 NEAR HERE 
 
4.3 Methods 
Since we censored our dependent variable showing a high percentage (27.5%) 
of observations at the lower limit, we adopted a Tobit regression methodology 
(Bowen & Wiersema, 2004; Greene, 2002), frequently used in similar contexts 
(Merino et al., 2014; Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014) in order to take into account the 
peculiar nature of our measure. Tobit regression coefficients estimate the linear effect 
on the uncensored latent variable but not the observed outcome. Therefore we may 
interpret these coefficients in a similar manner to OLS regression. This means that in 
our case, we estimate coefficients only for those firms engaged in internationalization. 
We controlled for potential reverse causation from our measure of 
internationalization to the presence of external managers by lagging our explanatory 
variables by three years. In other words, we used the dependent variable for 2006 and 
the explanatory variables (including all the control variables) for 2003. Prior studies 
(George et al., 2005; Zahra, 2003) also use this approach to deal with potential 
endogeneity. 
In order to test our hypotheses we ran a series of regressions reported in Table 
5. We first tested our hypotheses on the role of external managers using the whole 
sample (Model 2) and then we split the sample and ran two separate regressions 
(Models 3 and 4), one with just family-influenced and one with just family-controlled 
firms. As a further test we also ran two separate regressions with interactions (Model 
5 and 6). In Model 5 we interacted a dummy variable (Family-influenced) - the 
variable took the value 1 if the company was a family-influenced SME, and 0 
otherwise - with the variable measuring the presence of external managers (External 
managers). We then included in Model 6 a continuous variable measuring the 
percentage of family ownership (Family ownership) to test its direct effect on a firm’s 
international diversification (or scope), and finally we multiplied this variable by the 
presence of external managers (External managers) to capture any interaction effect. 
Since precise data on family ownership percentage were missing in 9 cases, the 
regression of Model 6 (Table 5) had only 408 observations and not 417 as in the 
previous Models. 
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TABLE 5 NEAR HERE 
 
5. RESULTS 
We report our main results in Table 5. In a Tobit regression, Pseudo R-squared 
is different to R-squared from the OLS regressions. We calculated McFadden's 
pseudo R-squared as one minus the ratio of the log likelihood of the full model over 
the log likelihood of the constant-only model. The values of the pseudo R-squared 
indicated that the predictors in our models were effective. As a further test that our 
model was correctly specified we ran a link test (Pregibon, 1980) using the linktest 
command in Stata and regressing, using a Tobit procedure, our dependent variable on 
the prediction and the prediction squared. We found a statistically significant 
predictor, while the prediction squared did not have any explanatory power, 
confirming the absence of specification problems in our model.  
Model 1 in Table 5 was our baseline model that included only control 
variables. In Model 2 we added our main independent variable, the dummy variable 
for External managers. The coefficient was positive and significant (p<0.1) as 
expected, confirming H1 for the whole sample of family SMEs.  
We report our most interesting results for Models 3 and 4 where we split our 
sample in two for each contingency: Model 3 shows the regression results for the 
sample of family-influenced SMEs, while Model 4 generates results for the sample of 
family-controlled SMEs. For family-controlled SMEs (Model 4) the coefficient for 
External managers was negative and not statistically significant. In contrast, the 
coefficient in family-influenced SMEs (Model 3) was both positive and significant at 
the 5% level. Overall the results confirmed our H2 that the effect of External 
managers on family SME internationalization depends on the concentration of family 
ownership, so that the relationship holds true for family-influenced SMEs but not for 
family-controlled SMEs.  
We also found support for H2 in multiple tests that used the interaction terms 
reported in Model 5 and 6 of Table 5. Model 5 shows that ownership <50% in a 
Family influenced company per se does not have a positive and significant effect on 
family SME international scope and we report the same result for the presence of 
External managers. However, the interaction term of these two variables (Family 
influenced and External managers) is significant (p<0.05) and it has a positive sign, 
suggesting that the presence of externally hired managers in family-influenced firms 
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produced the positive effect on international scope. We also ran an additional 
regression (Model 6), interacting the percentage of family ownership (Family 
ownership) with the External managers variable. We expected a negative sign on the 
interaction for high levels of family ownership and the results further supported H2. 
In this case, Family ownership is not significant while the presence of External 
managers in family SMEs is positive and significant (p<0.01). More importantly, the 
interaction term has the hypothesised negative sign (p<0.05), suggesting that SMEs 
with lower level of family ownership and external managers tend to have a higher 
level of international scope. All these results support a synergistic relation between 
family influenced SMEs (i.e. with lower levels of family ownership, or openness 
towards external capital) and the presence of external managers.  
This interaction is further illustrated in Figure 1 where we show the effects of 
the interaction term (i.e. External managers used as a moderator) as estimated in 
Model 6 of Table 5. Figure 1 reports the percentage of family ownership on the x-axis 
and the level of internationalization on the y-axis.  The Figure shows that the level of 
internationalization of family SMEs with only family managers (continuous line) is 
higher when the level of family ownership is high (i.e. family controlled, i.e. external 
capital participation is low). On the contrary, the level of internationalization of 
family SMEs that employ also external managers (dotted line) is higher when the 
level of family ownership is low (i.e. family influenced, i.e. the ownership structure is 
more open to outside investors). In other words, the positive effects of hiring external 
managers on the international scope of family SMEs are evident when the ownership 
structure of the company is open to external capital (i.e. with low levels of family 
ownership).  For ease of reading, we set the constant term at 0 (in the model, actually 
-0.894). Since we use a binary variable (i.e. External managers) as moderator we do 
not employ standardized variables (Aiken & West, 1991).  
Figure 1, a graphical presentation of the interaction between family ownership 
and external managers on the internationalization of Italian family SMEs, presents a 
slope test for the regression line when firms have only family managers, which is 
positive and equal to 0.00132 (p=0.335) but insignificant. (This is the regression 
coefficient of the variable Family ownership as reported in Model 6, Table 5). The 
slope test for the regression line when firms also have external managers is negative 
and equal to -0.005 (p=0.727) but is also not significant. This does not represent a 
problem in the context of our research aim, to evaluate whether there is a significant 
Comment [A1]: This goes against the relevant hypothesis.  Internationalization should be lower in this case. 
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difference between the slopes (of the two trajectories) themselves. In our case the 
significance of the interaction term remains the main criterion for rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient term is equal to 0 and this is sufficient to support our 
hypothesis H2 (Dawson, 2014). Since the significance level of the interaction term in 
Model 6 of Table 5 is equal to -0.006 (p=0.002) and is significant, we can conclude 
that the effect of external managers on internationalization (Entropy) depends on the 
level of family ownership.  
 
FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
5.1 Robustness Check 
In addition to the tests described above, we ran further robustness checks. 
First, we ran a Tobit analysis substituting our dependent variable entropy with the 
more prevalent FSTS ratio. Second, we ran our regressions using OLS with entropy 
and FSTS as dependent variables separately. In all cases we found results very similar 
to those reported here, thus further corroborating our findings.  
Next, we ran additional tests for the interaction term. First, we checked that 
the signs and statistical significance of the interaction term, and the graphical 
representation obtained with OLS were consistent with our results using the Tobit 
methodology. Once again the results were in line with the findings already reported in 
Table 5. Second, following Buis (2010) we checked the differences between marginal 
and multiplicative effects, computing the influence on international scope for the 
variables external managers, and for family-influenced and family-controlled firms. 
The effect on the level of international scope for family-controlled firms with external 
managers was .498 (p<0.01) while the coefficient for family-influenced firms with 
external managers was .713 (p<0.01). The marginal effect of being a family-
influenced firm with external managers was positive and equal to 0.215, confirming 
the positive and significant sign of the interaction term reported in Model 5.  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
Our results illustrate two important features. First, neither family ownership 
and control, nor the professionalization of management through the employment of 
external managers, can independently explain the international scope of family SMEs. 
Internationalization can only be maximized if both the management team and the 
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ownership structure are open to outside influence. Unless both equity capital and the 
management team are opened to outsiders, the full positive effects of external 
managers will not be enjoyed. For international scope, family SMEs may therefore 
consider an integrated and coherent corporate governance strategy in order to 
internalise external “bridging” social capital, and also open up their equity capital, 
thus reinforcing the role played by external managers.  
In family firms, two forms of social capital - the family’s and the firm’s - 
coexist and may create governance and managerial dilemmas (Arregle at al., 2007; 
Lansberg, 1983). They may reflect two incompatible sets of values and norms, with 
the former oriented towards trust and strong social ties to assure the care and 
nurturance of family members, while the latter may follow an economic rationale to 
pursue efficiency (Lansberg, 1983). In family firms where the family group is 
dominant (in both ownership and management), the values and norms of the family 
institution may prevail over the organization’s, constraining and eroding the efficient 
operation of family firms. In this type of firm, the presence of non-family 
managers/employees represents a context where inter-group heterogeneity and intra-
group interaction within the family could create potential conflict (Arregle at al., 
2007). In family firms where the family group is dominant and family social capital is 
strong, “…there is a tendency for the family to inappropriately capture the goodwill 
of external actors…” (Arregle at al., 2007, p. 87). This, in turn, can make non-family 
managers feel confined, thereby reducing their value to the firm.  
In corporate governance terms, if family ownership is dominant, then classic 
Type II agency costs exist, and with a mixed family and outside management, Type I 
costs may also potentially arise (see Quadrant 4 of Table 1). An explanation for these 
results is that external managers may find themselves isolated within the strong 
relational ties of family-controlled firms, where family norms can be dysfunctional 
(Arregle et al., 2007). These norms may give rise to extra agency costs, tensions and 
misunderstandings between owners and external executives, especially with the 
family’s bifurcation bias towards SEW objectives and greater loss aversion towards 
potentially risky/costly activities such as internationalization (Gomez-Mejia et. al, 
2014).  
Recent studies (Liang et al., 2014; Sciascia et al., 2012) report a curvilinear 
relationship between family ownership and internationalization. We did not estimate 
an optimal level of family ownership, but argue that the crucial factor is family 
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domination. With family ownership greater than 50%, the role for other “voices at the 
table” may be weaker, and the theoretically positive contribution of the bridging and 
bonding social capital of professional managers (once internalized within the 
boundary of the firm) may not have an effect on the scope of internationalization, and 
the margin between family and business objectives may blur. In this situation, family 
SMEs may favor non-economic goals, and the preservation of SEW may become a 
primary goal to the detriment of international scope. This result ties in with previous 
studies (e.g. Yang, 2010) reporting that high family ownership concentration may 
lead to a dominating influence that, in turn, could strongly attenuate any positive 
influence of external managers or a board with external members who promote 
internationalization (Calabrò et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, for family-influenced SMEs with a majority of external 
capital, a positive relationship between external managers and family SMEs’ 
international scope may prevail (see Quadrant 3 of Table 1), and interactions between 
family members and outsiders may contribute to the development of the family firm’s 
social capital (Arregle at al., 2007). In other words, when a family firm allows outside 
investors to have a majority of shares, Type II agency costs and other negative effects 
of being a family firm are offset. At the same time, Type I agency costs may 
potentially benefit from an alignment between ownership and managerial diversity. In 
this case, while the positive effects of being a family firm remain, the presence of 
external capital and managers could combine synergistically, providing bridging and 
bonding social capital to promote international scope. When outside owners invest in 
a family business this means that the company is open not only to new investors but 
also to new managerial approaches and new ideas. Outside shareholders are extremely 
important since they play a signalling role: they are a concrete indication that the 
business is not just inward-looking but also open to external influences. The joint 
presence of external capital and external managers could attenuate the preservation of 
SEW and any tendency towards risk aversion in family SMEs, thus encouraging 
international scope. This result is in line with Sanchez-Bueno & Usero (2014) who 
found that the presence and ownership of a strategic investor as second largest 
shareholder in a family firm favored international diversification. However, the 
“openness” of family SMEs towards external capital must be coupled with the 
professionalization of management through the employment of external managers. 
This research also offers a second important feature. It provides new evidence 
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that the family business world is heterogeneous and we respond to the plea that “…a 
theory of the family firm must be able to explain variations among family businesses” 
Chrisman et al. (2012, p. 267). Our results show that closely-held family firms are 
structurally different from family-influenced firms (Arregle et al., 2012), with 
different performance characteristics.  
This could explain the inconclusive nature of the prior literature on family 
firm internationalization so far. Previous studies, failing to differentiate between 
family control and influence and/or between different levels of family ownership, 
could suffer from a specification problem, with a crucial omitted variable, when 
trying to explain the main determinants of internationalization. Thus, some conflicting 
prior results may have simply been the result of sample bias. If the sample analysed 
was dominated by family-controlled firms, then the role of external managers may 
have been under-estimated, or over-estimated in case of a sample dominated by 
family-influenced firms.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In a fresh attempt to understand the ownership conditions under which 
professional managers recruited from outside the family, Benavides-Velasco et al.  
(2013) favour internationalization by SMEs, this paper claims implications for 7.1 
theory and 7.2 management practice. 
 
7.1 Implications for Theory 
Our paper contributes to the general SME internationalization literature by 
analyzing the role played by “external” influences (e.g. Agndal et al., 2008; Kontinen 
& Ojala, 2011a; Musteen et al., 2010; Prashantham, 2011; Zhou et al., 2007), in the 
form of professional managers recruited outside the family and their interaction with 
“internal” family ownership (e.g. George et al., 2005). A dominant view emphasizes a 
lack of market knowledge that constrains SME internationalization (e.g. Lu & 
Beamish, 2001). The extant family firm literature clearly demonstrates (Gedajlovic, 
Lubatkin & Schulze, 2004) that insider hiring at a managerial level can generally be 
detrimental. In this debate, an increasing number of scholars (Kotinen & Ojala, 
2011a, 2011b; Musteen et al., 2010; Prashantham, 2011; Presutti et al., 2007; Yli-
Renko et al., 2002; Zhou et al., 2007) have applied social capital theory to show how 
firms can overcome these knowledge constraints, by leveraging their networks of 
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relationships to access specific resources that promote internationalization. According 
to this view, externally-recruited professional managers have been considered 
particularly valuable because they provide additional specialized knowledge beyond 
the firm’s boundaries that are extremely relevant to resource-constrained SMEs 
venturing across complex international business activities (e.g. Stewart & Hitt, 2012). 
By integrating social capital and corporate governance theories, and by employing the 
distinction between family-controlled and family-influenced SMEs, we showed that, 
in the context of family SME internationalization (Calabrò et al., 2013; Kontinen & 
Ojala, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Liang et al., 2014; Merino et al., 2014; Pukall & Calabrò, 
2014; Segaro, Larimo & Jones, 2014; Sciascia et al., 2012), externally-hired 
professional managers can only fully exert their potential if coupled with external 
ownership, allowing bridging and bonding social capital to emerge with the alignment 
of the positive effects of agency, stewardship and SEW processes.  
  This paper, focused on one strategy (i.e. the recruitment of non-family 
managers), viewed through the lens of social capital theory and governance (family 
ownership), can be seen as a response to the plea that “…future studies should attempt 
to provide different dimensions of learning orientation…” (Baum, Schwens & Kabst, 
2015, p. 11), and suggests that the recruitment of outside managers may lie behind the 
“intense network contacts” reported to underpin internationalization (Baum et al., 
2015).  
We also claim that our paper may be considered in the wider context of 
theories of governance, strategy and performance, mainly based on large firms, where 
ownership structures are complex and information on strategies (e.g. the composition 
of executive boards and the degree of international diversification) is difficult to 
assess. In the relatively simplified ownership context of family SMEs it has been 
possible to investigate interactions between governance and strategy in relation to 
strategic outcomes. Our findings may have wider relevance in the context of large 
firms, and interactions between governance dimensions and other strategic decisions 
concerning not only executive hires but also organizational forms and joint ventures 
in host countries. Unfortunately, large firms tend to be complex in terms of 
governance and internal strategies are often unobservable. In this sense, family SMEs 
have provided a fruitful laboratory for identifying one key interaction. 
Our paper also advances the literature in terms of the metrics of family SME 
internationalization. Previous studies have used FSTS as a measure of 
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internationalization. By using the entropy index (supported by similar results for 
FSTS) we align our study of SMEs with the most recent and advanced literature on 
international diversification (Gomez-Mejia, et al. 2010; Hitt et al. 2006; Majocchi & 
Strange, 2012; Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014).  
In addition, because of difficulties in obtaining a continuous measure of 
ownership levels in family firms, most contemporary research has frequently used a 
simple family/non-family SME distinction (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). Besides this 
family-influenced/family-controlled distinction, we checked our H2 for robustness, 
using a more fine-grained, continuous measure of family ownership, which we 
interacted with the presence of professional managers recruited from outside the 
family. This may also help to understand previously inconsistent empirical results (as 
explained above) and drive future research on this topic.  
 
7.2 Implications for Practitioners 
This research may have implications for practitioners, including family 
shareholders, outside shareholders, family managers and outsiders. Family-controlled 
SMEs needing extra resources for internationalization should be aware that either 
additional outside managers (Model 4, Table 5) or additional outside shareholders 
(Model 5, Table 5) on their own are not positively associated with 
internationalization. Knowledge of this outcome could deter outside investors from 
investing in firms that remain family-controlled: if family owners continue to control 
the firm, SEW theory would suggest that they are likely to suffer from bifurcation 
bias in favour of sources of utility other than dividends for all shareholders. Outside 
lenders aware of this outcome may also be wary about loans to family-controlled 
firms.  
The positive relationship that we report between externally recruited managers 
and exporting has potential implications for managers and investors too. Providing 
that such exporting is profitable, the higher productivity of external managers can 
earn them higher rewards and job security, or generate higher returns for investors, or 
both. 
For family SMEs themselves, the novel implication of this study is that if they 
want to derive full value from externally-recruited managers, they should 
simultaneously concede majority ownership control. Outside managers, investors and 
lenders may prefer to seek involvement in firms with external managers, and where 
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family ownership is less than 50%. Again, the implication for family owners and 
managers in family-controlled firms without external managers is that they probably 
need to consider whether the trade-off between the benefits of outside shareholders 
and managers together is worth possible losses of SEW. 
 
7.3 Limitations and Further Research 
Despite its theoretical and practical implications, however, this study also has 
four main limitations that could constitute opportunities for further research and 
refinement. First, our empirical setting is Italy, a single country with a large number 
of family SMEs that feature weak protection of minority interests (Mazzi, 2011). It 
has been shown that the legal protection of minority shareholders (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2008) determines the effect of family ownership. 
Consequently it could be that the positive effects of outside shareholders are 
particularly strong in this institutional setting. Nevertheless, international 
comparisons, including different corporate legal systems, beyond Italy could validate 
our findings. For example, measures of cultural/institutional distance could identify 
other influences. 
Second, our associations identify, for manufacturing SMEs only, what effect 
external influences have on family SMEs’ international scope, but cannot 
conclusively establish why. Meanwhile, however, some case studies are consistent 
with our associations at a micro-level. Hagen & Majocchi (2014) report the case of 
Luxottica, a small, local, Italian manufacturer of frame components in the 1960s that 
evolved into the world leader in the eyewear and sunglasses business, owning iconic 
brands such as Ray-Ban and Oakley among others. International expansion by 
Luxottica was evidently triggered by the decision to introduce professional managers. 
Interestingly, the first strategic decision of the new, outsider-influenced board was to 
obtain a listing on the NYSE and this provided the funds for internationalization as 
well as a new governance structure. Additional anecdotal evidence from around the 
world (e.g. Graves & Thomas, 2006) also refers to the need for external managerial 
capabilities and externally generated funds as conditions for international expansion 
of family firms. However, we need further qualitative research on this topic to 
identify precisely how external influences enhance internationalization. 
Third, although our study did have a temporal element to the extent of using 
lags to identify causation, it can add little to the extant literature on pathways to 
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internationalization, e.g. traditional (incremental) internationalizing firms, “born 
globals”, “born-again globals” (Tuppura, Saarenketo, Puumalainen, Jantunen & 
Kyläheiko, 2008), and “born regionals” (Baum et al., 2015). At the same time, this 
limitation represents a research opportunity, noted below.   
Finally, a lack of data meant that we could not control for different 
internationalization strategies. Further research may also establish the levels of 
education and the nationalities of external managers as well as their previous work 
experience.  
Besides these weaknesses, however, we suggest new avenues for research. For 
SMEs, it could be important to discover which particular functional expertise (e.g. 
marketing, administrative, finance, operations, etc.) and/or skills (e.g. foreign 
language ability) is contributed by externally-recruited managers. Approximately 50% 
of internationalizing SMEs are traditional, incremental internationalizers (Baum et al., 
2015) and Tuppura et al. (2008) emphasize the importance of accumulating expertise 
(especially market knowledge) for these firms.  
This could complement our focus on external hires. Besides this strategy of 
external hiring, it would also be interesting to establish how other strategies (e.g. 
external borrowing and managers recruited from countries that are targets for 
internationalization) may interact with ownership characteristics.  
Another interesting research avenue could involve investigating histories of 
inside and outside managers working together in the decision-making process 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989) and how they can facilitate the emergence of effective norms 
and values, thereby strengthening bonding and bridging social capital and thus 
favoring successful venturing into foreign markets. 
Beyond SMEs, the application of social capital theory to the context of SME 
internationalization suggests that it may also be applied to larger firms, with new 
investigations along the lines suggested by Toms & Filatotchev (2004), possibly 
embracing human as well as social capital. Finally, it should be noted that, of course, 
there is no guarantee that any increased scale or scope of internationalization is a 
“good thing” (Brouthers et al., 2009), and further research should be able to complete 
the governance-strategy-performance sequence by adding SMEs’ financial 
performance to the analysis. 
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Table 1: The consequences of ownership (family-influenced vs family-controlled) and management 
involvement (family managers only vs family and external managers)  
 
  Family ownership 
  Influenced (<50%) Controlled (>50%) 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
 F
am
ily
 O
nl
y 
Quadrant 1 
 
Agency costs (Type I)  
(+) family managers aligned with 
family owners  
(-) but not with majority outside 
shareholders 
 
Agency costs (Type II)  
(-) minority family shareholders find 
support from family managers to 
exploit outside shareholders 
 
Stewardship/SEW 
(+) stewardship and SEW moderated by 
majority outside shareholders 
(+) lower loss aversion 
(+) less bifurcation bias in favour of 
family SEW 
(+) access to external capital  
(-) but less patient capital 
(-) managerial under-training 
(Carnegie effect), nepotism, 
entrenchment 
 
Quadrant 2 
 
Agency costs (Type I) 
(+) family managers aligned with 
family owners 
 
 
 
Agency costs (Type II)  
(-) majority family shareholders find 
support from family managers to 
exploit minority outside shareholders  
 
Stewardship/SEW  
(-) emphasis on stewardship and SEW: 
high loss aversion 
(-) Bifurcation bias in favour of SEW 
(-) limited access to capital 
(+) but more patient capital 
(-) managerial under-training 
(Carnegie effect), nepotism, 
entrenchment 
 
Fa
m
ily
 a
nd
 E
xt
er
na
l 
Quadrant 3 
 
Agency costs (Type I)  
(-) weaker incentives for self- 
monitoring by family managers 
(+) managerial diversity aligned with 
ownership diversity  
 
Agency costs (Type II)  
(+) family and outside shareholders 
find some support from family and 
outside managers. More “voices at the 
table” reduce agency type II costs 
 
 
Stewardship/SEW 
(+) stewardship and SEW moderated by 
majority outside shareholders and 
outside managers 
(+) lower loss aversion 
(+) low bifurcation bias in favour of 
SEW 
(+) access to outside capital  
(-) but less patient 
 
Quadrant 4 
 
Agency costs (Type I)  
(-) potential alignment problems 
between family shareholders and 
outside managers 
 
 
Agency costs (Type II) 
(-) majority family shareholders find 
support from family managers to 
exploit minority shareholders and 
outside managers 
 
 
Stewardship/SEW 
(+) stewardship and SEW moderated by 
external mangers 
(-) higher loss aversion 
(-) bifurcation bias in favour of SEW 
(-) limited access to capital 
(+) but more patient  
 
Note: The signs (+/-) are from the agency perspective of economic efficiency. 
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Table 2: Variable names, constructs and measurements 
 
Variables name Constructs and measurements  Source 
DEPENDENT   
Entropy  Scale and scope of internationalization 
(export dispersion) 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010); 
Majocchi & Strange (2012) 
INDEPENDENT   
External managers Dummy variable = 1 if firm has hired 
external managers in addition to family 
managers 
Adapted from Arregle et al. 
(2012); Majocchi & Strange 
(2012) 
Family influenced Dummy variable = 1 if family ownership is 
less than 50% 
Sirmon et al. (2008); Arregle 
et al. (2012) 
Fam inf*Ext mng Interaction Family influenced × External 
managers 
 
Family ownership Percentage of family ownership (%) Graves & Thomas (2006); 
Fernandez & Nieto (2006) 
Fam own*Ext mng Interaction Family ownership × External 
managers 
 
CONTROL   
Age Number of years since foundation Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) 
Size Natural log of number of employees Verwaal & Donkers (2002) 
Traditional/Scale-
intensive/Specialized 
suppliers/Science-
based 
Dummy variables for Pavitt industrial 
sectors 
 
Cerrato & Piva (2012) 
North-West/North-
East/Centre/South 
and Islands 
Dummy variables for firm’s location within 
Italy 
Basile (2001) 
Group Dummy = 1 if the firm is part of a business 
group 
Cerrato & Piva (2012) 
R&D Number of employees in R&D over total 
number of employees (%) 
Hoffman et al. (1998) 
ROI Return on investment Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010)* 
Reg_sales Sales in EU over total sales (regional 
export intensity) (%) 
Adapted from Hashai (2011) 
Note 1: *Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) used ROA as a measure of performance.  
Note 2: All independent variables refer to 2003, the dependent variable (Entropy) refers to 2006. 
Note 3: The variable External managers is also used as moderator in Models 5 and 6 of Table 5. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of binary variables 
 
  Freq Perc 
External managers 0=No 290 69.54 
 1=Yes 127 30.46 
Pavitt Traditional 224 53.72 
 Scale-intensive 62 14.87 
 Specialised-suppliers 118 28.30 
 Science-based 13 3.12 
Area North West 156 3741 
 North East 125 29.99 
 Centre 80 19.38 
 South & Islands 56 13.43 
Group 0=No 
1=Yes 
367 
50 
88.01 
11.99 
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlation of continuous variables 
 
 Mean SD Age Size R&D ROI Reg_sales 
Age 31.61 23.79 1.     
Size 4.01 .719 0.143*** 1.    
R&D .035 .590 0.038 0.005 1.   
ROI 15.98 28.81 -0.0982** -0.2184*** 0.0644 1  
Reg_sales 51.02 38.29 0.0617 0.0957* 0.0349 0.0010 1 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
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Table 5: Tobit regressions results on entropy 
 
Entropy Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
   Family-
influenced 
Family-
controlled 
  
Age 0.000631 0.000539 0.00129 -0.00338 0.000479 0.000452 
 (0.00120) (0.00119) (0.00137) (0.00228) (0.00119) (0.00119) 
Size 0.232*** 0.211*** 0.258*** 0.137** 0.218*** 0.221*** 
 (0.0419) (0.0436) (0.0552) (0.0691) (0.0434) (0.0436) 
Scale-intensive -0.0205 -0.00938 0.0378 -0.0935 0.00197 -0.00942 
 (0.0850) (0.0849) (0.106) (0.136) (0.0845) (0.0842) 
Specialized 
suppliers 
0.231*** 0.223*** 0.221*** 0.193* 0.230*** 0.214*** 
 (0.0674) (0.0674) (0.0810) (0.113) (0.0671) (0.0670) 
Science-based 0.00581 0.00713 -0.382 0.205 0.0214 0.00470 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.287) (0.231) (0.172) (0.178) 
North-East -0.0860 -0.0786 -0.204** 0.0649 -0.0781 -0.0505 
 (0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0912) (0.108) (0.0699) (0.0700) 
Centre -0.0845 -0.0778 -0.0619 -0.210 -0.0855 -0.0872 
 (0.0807) (0.0806) (0.0936) (0.146) (0.0802) (0.0800) 
South and Islands -0.0713 -0.0631 -0.119 -0.0270 -0.0708 -0.0573 
 (0.0939) (0.0937) (0.113) (0.155) (0.0930) (0.0945) 
Group 0.158* 0.134 -0.0164 0.317** 0.147* 0.113 
 (0.0870) (0.0880) (0.126) (0.122) (0.0884) (0.0898) 
R&D 1.418*** 1.398*** 1.527*** 1.415 1.339*** 1.408*** 
 (0.488) (0.487) (0.563) (0.950) (0.484) (0.481) 
ROI 0.000730 0.000771 7.49e-05 0.000605 0.000729 0.000768 
 (0.00103) (0.00102) (0.00141) (0.00149) (0.00102) (0.00102) 
Reg_sales 0.00457*** 0.00455*** 0.00472*** 0.00375*** 0.00441*** 0.00459*** 
 (0.000771) (0.000768) (0.000966) (0.00122) (0.000766) (0.000769) 
External managers  0.105* 0.192** -0.0550 -0.0743 0.421*** 
  (0.060) (0.0789) (0.110) (0.101) (0.143) 
Family influenced     -0.0754  
     (0.0698)  
Fam inf*Ext mng     0.284**  
     (0.123)  
Family ownership      0.00132 
      (0.00142) 
Fam own*Ext mng      -0.00643** 
      (0.00251) 
Constant -0.846*** -0.793*** -0.980*** -0.346 -0.764*** -0.894*** 
 (0.186) (0.188) (0.233) (0.307) (0.190) (0.207) 
Pseudo R2 .1424 .1456 .2113 .1277 .1523 .1521 
Obs. (left-censored) 417(114) 417(114) 254(68) 163(46) 417 (114) 408 (110) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Interaction between Family ownership and External managers on Internationalization 
 
 
Note: Constant term set equal to 0. Uncentered variables. 
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